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Protecting the NFL/militarizing the homeland: Citizen soldiers and urban resilience in post-9/11 America

Kimberly S Schimmel
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Abstract
In this article I focus on intersections between the National Football League’s (NFL) security practices and the US Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) counter-terrorism agenda, including new policies and legal structures that support pre-emption, protection, and preparation activities that manage and mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks. As I will argue, the intensifying and mutually supportive relationship between the NFL and the various forces employed to keep it safe is both unique in US sports and implies the militarization of football fans in somewhat unexpected ways. I will argue that the security strategies of the US government and those of the NFL are mutually beneficial in ways that help secure the NFL’s position and profitability and, more importantly, help implement and secure consensus for the US Department of Homeland Security’s continued ‘war on terror’. Coaffee’s recent work on urban resilience in the UK (Coaffee, 2009; Coaffee and Wood, 2006) contends that in the present historical moment, ‘security is becoming more civic, urban, domestic, and personal’ (Coaffee, 2009: 9). How, if at all, does resilience play out in the context of anti-terrorism policy in post-9/11 America? How, if at all, does US professional football articulate with that policy? These are two key questions I intend to address during the course of this article.

Keywords
battlespace, government contractor defense, NFL, post-9/11 America, SAFETY Act, urban resilience, US Department of Homeland Security

Every citizen must be a soldier. This was the case with the Greeks and the Romans, and must be that of every free state. (Thomas Jefferson, Third President of the United States)

In a provocative post-9/11 blog post, legal scholar Anthony Sebok (2003) proposes the term ‘citizen soldier’ to explain the symbolic ramifications of the Support

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Antiterrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies (or SAFETY) Act, passed by the US Congress in 2002 to ensure that lack of insurance and concerns over liability did not impede the development of anti-terrorism technologies. Arguing that the new legal protections offered civilian companies creating ‘qualified anti-terrorism technology’ effectively turns the US into a battlefield, civilian companies into government defense contractors, and all US citizens into soldiers by implication, Sebok suggests a troubling new conflation between military and civilian discourses and practices. While the concept of the citizen soldier is not itself new, as the opening quote acknowledges, its (re) emergence in the post-9/11 landscape hints at a different set of obligations and sacrifices expected of those occupying the role – that is, of all of us.

In this article I examine emergent security efforts of the National Football League (NFL), its stadiums and its fans, suggesting that these efforts – which are encouraged and enforced by the US government and US military – render the NFL a uniquely militarized sport association and the annual Super Bowl game a uniquely militarized sport mega-event. This approach extends an ongoing research inquiry into urbanization and militarization and builds directly upon two prior studies: the first (Schimmel, 2006) linking stadium development and urban growth ideology with the militarization of US urban society; and the second (Schimmel, 2011) examining US news media (print and online) discourses of stadium and event security at the Super Bowl. In the present article, I focus on intersections between the NFL’s security practices and the US Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) counter-terrorism agenda, including new policies and legal structures that support pre-emption, protection, and preparation activities that manage and mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks. As I will argue, the intensifying and mutually supportive relationship between the NFL and the various forces employed to keep it safe is both unique in US sports and implies the citizen-soldiering of football fans in somewhat unexpected ways. Coaffee’s recent work on urban resilience in the UK (Coaffee, 2009; Coaffee and Wood, 2006) contends that in the present historical moment, ‘security is becoming more civic, urban, domestic, and personal’ (Coaffee, 2009: 9). How, if at all, does resilience play out in the context of anti-terrorism policy in post-9/11 America? How, if at all, does US professional football articulate with that policy? I elaborate on the notion of urban resilience below and also address the question, why the NFL?

**Urban resilience**

In his 2003 book *Terrorism, Risk and the City: The Making of a Contemporary Urban Landscape*, Jon Coaffee analyzes governmental security strategy in the UK, focusing on the decision in the 1970s to create a heavily fortified ‘ring of steel’ around parts of Belfast and London to keep them safe from terrorist attacks. In an updated version of the book in 2009, now centered on the global city and subtitled *Towards Urban Resilience*, Coaffee expands his analytic scope to include the changes wrought by the 9/11 attacks in both the UK and (to lesser extent) the US. Noting that 11 September made the rings of steel approach to ‘counter-terrorist tactics appear inadequate’ and that security policy began to shift to more anticipatory and preparatory measures (2009: 84), Coaffee engages with and problematizes the gradually emergent discourse of urban resilience (or what
Medd and Marvin [2005] term the governance of preparedness) in global anti-terrorist strategies and policies. He notes that while the term resilience first emerged in research on the stressors faced by ecological systems, it has been applied over the past decade to a broad range of phenomena, including human social systems, economic recovery, disaster planning, and now security (Coaffee, 2009).

Defined by the UK Resilience website as ‘the ability to detect, prevent and if necessary handle disruptive challenges [including] challenges arising from the possibility of a terrorist attack’ (Coaffee, 2006: 504), a resilience approach translates to anti-terrorist policies that are ‘increasingly anticipatory and pre-emptive as preparation for the inevitable attack’ (Coaffee, 2009: 9). The specific trends that accelerated post-9/11 and are positioned by Coaffee and Wood (2006) within an urban resilience framework include:

1) the growth of electronic surveillance within public and semi-public urban spaces, in particular automated software-driven systems. (2006: 507);

2) the increased popularity of physical or symbolic notions of the boundary and territorial closure. (e.g. gated communities, defended airports etc.; 2006: 508);

3) the increasing sophistication and cost of security and contingency planning undertaken by organizations and different levels of government. (2006: 508); and

4) the linking of resilience and security strategies to competition for footloose global capital. (2006: 58)

Coaffee and Wood conclude by suggesting that the concept of security has ‘come home’, or has been ‘reterritorialized’ such that the influence of national and international security discourses and procedures is effectively scaled down to urban communities and ordinary citizens. Contradictorily, however, this reterritorialization co-exists in government policies with the positioning of terrorist threats as ‘everywhere and nowhere’ (Coaffee and Wood, 2006: 514), which risks generating a permanently fearful – and thus more easily controllable – populace (Coaffee, 2009).

In this perspective of the city as ‘battlespace’ (see Graham, 2009), what is the role of sport in general and football in particular? I have argued elsewhere (Schimmel, 2006, 2011) that the ongoing militarization of urban space, hastened by the 9/11 attacks, is made visible in specific sport practices, discourses and policies and seems more palatable to Americans in a sport landscape than in other seemingly ‘terrorist-ready’ contexts (see also Warren, 2004). In part, sport represents an example of the ‘scaled-down’ or more ‘domestic’ and ‘personal’ contexts (to borrow Coaffée’s terminology) in which national and international security strategies play out in the 21st century. As such, the four trends noted above can be traced in the specific policies and practices regarding NFL security. However, my aim in this article is not simply to apply Coaffée’s broad arguments about urban resilience to the case of US football. Rather, I will argue that the security strategies of the US government and those of the NFL are mutually beneficial in ways that help secure the NFL’s position and profitability and, more importantly, help implement and secure consensus for the US Department of Homeland Security’s ‘war on terror’. This relationship is intentional, is intensifying, is mutually supportive, and was
institutionalized in 2009 through the National Infrastructure Protection Plan and the SAFETY Act noted in my opening paragraph.

In the following section I briefly describe the National Football League and its premier event (the Super Bowl) in its contemporary urban context; this material will be familiar to some readers but not others. I then detail anti-terrorist strategies undertaken by the NFL post-9/11 and explore the NFL's ‘exceptionalism’ in the context of urban resilience policy in the US. I conclude by a return to the notion of the citizen soldier and her/his enlistment in the US war on terrorism.

The NFL and the Super Bowl in urban context

From the first ‘paid’ football players in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in the 1890s, through its early growth phase in the single-industry towns of Ohio, to the placement of contemporary franchises, professional football has always been an urban game. The NFL was founded in 1920 in Canton, Ohio, a city located in the middle of Ohio’s fiercest football rivalries and home of football’s best team at the time (profootballhof.com, 2011). The enduring success of the League is due to cooperation among team owners and their adoption of the business model established in the 1870s by Major League Baseball. The model contained three elements that became taken-for-granted features of the American professional sports industry: cartelization, monopoly, and monopsony. These business practices have established Major League Baseball, The National Football League, the National Hockey League and the National Basketball Association as some of the most powerful firms in the history of the United States.

Cartelization, which is illegal in the US in businesses other than sports,4 refers to the general practice of owners of business firms acting together to make decisions about the production and distribution of their products (in this case sports). Sport franchise owners have a remarkably complex set of rules designed to restrict business competition for athletic labor and divide geographical markets for individual franchises. Even though each team is a separate business entity, the owners look out for the collective interest of the league. For example, all leagues have rules for revenue sharing among teams, and owners vote on the placement, ownership, and number of franchises in the league. In addition, television and radio broadcasts, admission to games, and the sale of team-related merchandise are all subject to league regulations. In short, monopoly practices manipulate the distribution of professional sport to consumers. Monsopsony practices, on the other hand, manipulate the cost of acquiring sport labor. For example, league rules specify the procedures for drafting new players and binding them to contracts, thereby assuring bidding wars will not break out for athletic talent. Eventually, other sport owners for exactly the same reason embraced cartelization and economic concentration as did Major League Baseball: the creation of artificial scarcity in the marketplace increased consumer demand. Teams literally could not survive outside of a prestige league; they either merged into it or folded. For example, in the 1920s football had two leagues and 58 teams, but by the 1950s mergers, failures, and exclusions reduced the number of leagues to one and the NFL had control of the entire US market.5

Currently the NFL consists of 32 franchises (all except the Green Bay Packers are privately owned) located in 31 different cities across the US. The NFL has placed
franchises in 24 of the 30 largest ‘designated market areas’ and in every region of the country (citydata.com). Because of the limits imposed by the League’s business practices, however, there are more cities that want to host a team and that have the population base to support it than there are teams to go around. The NFL’s artificial scarcity, combined with a history of franchise relocation encourages bidding wars between cities wishing to obtain or retain teams. Success or failure at these efforts is seen to symbolize a city’s emerging or declining urban status and business climate. The NFL is thus linked to the larger growth discourse that accompanies the US model of urban development, where a fragmented and pluralistic urban system, market-oriented politics, and a deep commitment to localism are, in fact, the national urban policy. Here in the ‘capital of capitalism’ (see Kantor, 2010), fierce competition for capital investment and jobs produces winner and loser cities (and sections of cities) and glaring social inequities.

The NFL’s urban linkage goes far beyond the symbolic, however, to include material dimensions such as the reconstitution of urban space and the use of public funds for the purpose of sport-related infrastructure development and mega-projects such as stadia. NFL stadia are large (ranging from 63,000 to 92,000 in seating capacity), the vast majority are publicly owned, and they are expensive (all are tax-payer supported). New stadium construction becomes a central feature of the bidding wars for franchises because it is usually necessary if a city is to retain its ‘home’ franchise amidst owner’s threats to leave, or is to entice one in another city to relocate. Also, in some cities, new stadiums are necessary before those cities can host the NFL’s premiere event, the Super Bowl championship game (discussed below). The public’s return on investment is touted to include numerous material benefits, including employment growth and revenue creation that address social inequities and benefit all city residents. While over two decades of social science research refutes these claims the discourse connecting sport-related infrastructure development to urban growth and regeneration remains dominant and public investment in major sport facility construction continues apace. Between 1990 and 2009, over US$22 billion of public money was spent to build sport stadiums and arenas and to subsidize real estate developments in the immediate areas surrounding them (Brown et al., 2004; Coakley, 2009; Delaney and Eckstein, 2007).

The NFL’s Super Bowl is the most watched, single-game sporting event in the US. Played annually since 1967, it has become one of the most highly watched television shows of the year, with Super Bowl 2010 drawing the largest TV audience in US history (Newyorktimes.com, 2010). Competition related to Super Bowl occurs on at least three levels: franchises compete to qualify for the game; television networks compete for the rights to broadcast it; and cities compete for the opportunity to host it. Unlike championship games and series in other US professional sports in which the championship game is located in the cities whose teams qualify, NFL owners ‘award’ their championship game to a city with a ‘Super Bowl ready’ stadium based upon a competitive bidding process.

The Super Bowl is preceded by two weeks of massive media hype that includes not only analysis of players and teams, but also special features about the sport of football more generally, and about the city and stadium that will host the event. More spectacle than mere game (see for example, Butterworth, 2008; Falcous and Silk, 2005; Real, 1974), the Super Bowl build-up involves numerous NFL entertainment venues and a
600,000 square foot theme park called the ‘NFL Experience’, leading up to the production of ‘Super Bowl Sunday’ with its pre-game and halftime shows created to dramatize the connection between the National Football League and the ‘American’ way of life. Patriotic themes and messages are an established Super Bowl tradition, as is the involvement of the US military in Super Bowl rituals. From fighter jet ‘flyovers’, to the presentation of the US flag by military Color Guard, the marching of military bands, the singing of military choirs, and ‘live look ins’ to US military bases at home and abroad, the NFL and the US military have shared more than 40 years of Super Bowl history (Carden, 2009).

Since the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, however, military representation at – and involvement in – the Super Bowl has taken on new dimensions.\(^6\) New relationships are emerging, and established relationships are intensifying, between the US’s premier sport event, the NFL that controls it, and the various forces employed to keep it safe. Super Bowl stadiums, as well as symbolizing a city’s urban status and late-capitalist generation ‘successes’, are now also positioned as ‘terrorist targets’ in need of protection. New stadiums are thus developed based not only on franchise owners’ demands for profit and control, but also on the NFL’s increasingly security-focused requirements for hosting a Super Bowl\(^7\) (McCourt, 2010). These requirements include both the physical structure that houses the game and the urban spaces and communities in which the stadiums are located,\(^8\) which are increasingly viewed as terrain in which military tactics and weaponry are necessary to controls crowds and prevent and respond to terrorists attacks (Graham, 2004; Schimmel, 2006; Warren, 2004). In the post-9/11 period, the expanding powers of the US government combined with ever-increasing partnerships between the NFL, military forces, law enforcement, and private security entrepreneurs created increasingly militarized domestic urban terrains.\(^9\)

**Forging linkages/expanding powers: The US government, military contractors, and the NFL**

Just six weeks after the 9/11 attacks, the US Congress passed legislation that gave the President sweeping new powers of search and surveillance and expanded terrorism laws to include ‘domestic terrorism’. The 325-page Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act of 2001 was passed on 26 September and was followed by numerous executive orders, regulations, policies and practices. Little more than one year after that, President George W. Bush signed the Homeland Security Act of 2002 creating the nation’s 15th cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The ‘most extensive reorganization of the federal government in the past fifty years’ immediately consolidated 16 Federal Offices and for the first time in US history established a single federal department whose priority mission is to ‘prevent terrorist attacks within the United States’ (US Department of Homeland Security, 2002).

Over the course of the decade, the NFL and US government counter-terrorism agencies and private contractors linked up in mutually beneficial ways, developing the security-related practices that in 2009 were formally endorsed by the US Department
of Homeland Security. Of most relevance to this article is the number of public spaces, arenas and events that were deemed ‘target-worthy’ by the US government following 9/11, with the Super Bowl receiving special emphasis.10 The first Super Bowl after 9/11 was the first sporting event and only the 12th event overall to be designated as a ‘National Security Special Event’ (NSSE). Previous NSSE’s included Presidential inaugurations, Democratic and Republican National Conventions, and United Nations Assemblies (US Congressional Research Service, 2007). Once designated, the Secret Service (the federal agency responsible for protecting the President) assumes the mandated role as the lead agency in providing protection and ‘strengthening existing partnerships with federal, state, and local law enforcement’ (US Department of Homeland Security, 2003).

Consider the security-related activities that were introduced at Super Bowl events or that were associated with the NFL regular season between 2001 and 2010 (see Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year and location</th>
<th>Security-related activity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001 Super Bowl</td>
<td>FaceTrak™ biometric technology digitally scans the faces of all 100,000 fans and workers (without their knowledge) entering the stadium and matches them against a database, sorting them according to their criminal histories (Trigaux, 2001).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tampa, FL</td>
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<td>2002 Super Bowl</td>
<td>By White House designation, the Super Bowl becomes a National Special Security Event or NSSE (US Congressional Research Service, 2007).</td>
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<td>New Orleans, LA</td>
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<td>2003 Super Bowl</td>
<td>The Federal Immigration and Naturalization Service launches an ‘Operation Game Day’ dragnet in the city (located 15 miles from the Mexican border) in which 69 foreign-born security guards and taxi drivers are arrested (O’Driscoll, 2003).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego, CA</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004 Super Bowl</td>
<td>The NFL hires a private security firm specializing in crowd management to screen everyone entering the stadium (Vaishnav, 2004).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Houston, TX</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005 All NFL Games</td>
<td>The NFL institutes a new rule requiring ‘pat downs’ of every fan entering an NFL stadium and announces a ‘Fan Code of Conduct’ under which unruly patrons can be ejected or denied entrance without refund to stadiums and parking lots (McCarthy, 2008).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 Super Bowl</td>
<td>Local law enforcement teams-up with Pentagon security contractor GTSI and its InteGuard Alliance partners to install 100 VPN (Virtual Private Network) encrypted video cameras throughout the stadium and into the city, which are designed to ‘expand’ and ‘stay for decades’ (McEachern, 2005).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jacksonville, FL</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006 Super Bowl</td>
<td>The Federal Bureau of Investigation sends 250 personnel to the city where local police are assisted by an additional 50 federal, state, and local agencies. SWAT teams, ‘aided by digital maps covering every inch’ of the stadium, are ‘ready to respond on a moment’s notice’. The US asks Canadian officials to restrict private plane travel near the stadium, which is located one half mile from Canada (NewsEdge Corporation, 2006).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Detroit, MI</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year and location</th>
<th>Security-related activity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2007</strong> Super Bowl, Miami, FL</td>
<td>An Israeli airport security company, New Age Solutions, is contracted to expand its Behavior Pattern Recognition (BPR) training from Miami International Airport to the custodial staff at the Super Bowl, making Miami the first place in the US where civilian employees are trained in BPR methods to ‘look for bad people, not just bad things’ (Machlis, 2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2008</strong> Super Bowl, Glendale, AZ</td>
<td>Northrop Grunnman, Corp. is contracted to provide hazardous duty robots (Hulme, 2008). The US military provides PC-12 surveillance aircraft, Blackhawk helicopters, and Cessna Citation Interceptors to patrol the area. The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) sends the 162nd Fighter Wing F-16 Fighting Falcons to fly a series of defense deterrence missions over the cities of Tucson, Nogales, and Phoenix ‘to demonstrate NORAD’s quick-response capability’ (borderfirereport.net, 2008).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2009</strong> Super Bowl, Tampa, FL</td>
<td>US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, looking for people who are in the country illegally, screens up to 30,000 applications of individuals hoping to volunteer or work at Super Bowl facilities (Zink, 2008). The Transportation and Safety Administration (TSA) links with 70 local police officers that have been trained in the TSA’s behavior detection methods (Catalanello, 2009). The city of Tampa expands its use of E*SPONDER and Microsoft Surface technology, originally purchased in 2005 through a US Department of Homeland Security grant, to integrate all aspects of Super Bowl security (Microsoft.com, 2009).</td>
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<td><strong>2009</strong> US Supreme Court</td>
<td>In January the US Supreme Court refuses to hear the appeal of a NFL fan who argues that the NFL’s ‘pat downs’ violate his US Constitutional 4th Amendment right against unreasonable searches (Varian, 2009).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2010</strong> Super Bowl, Miami, FL</td>
<td>In the lead-up to the game, local police perform 498 biometric searches in high crime areas of the city with newly purchased Printrak Mobile Automated Identification System’s handheld devices designed to capture biometric information and search it against the police department’s criminal database. During Super Bowl security operations, officers perform 111 biometric searches, identify 58 people who had previous arrest records, and arrest 25 individuals (Morphotrak.com, 2010).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2010</strong> The US Pentagon</td>
<td>In June, the US Pentagon announces it will adopt the NFL’s ‘instant reply’ technology to monitor battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan (homelandsecuritynewswire.com, 2010).</td>
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Without question, the extra security demands of hosting an NFL team, and especially the Super Bowl game, have been leveraged by all levels of US government and police to forge linkages across various agencies and to expand capabilities of tracking and surveillance. Through Super Bowl security planning, local police gain access to Pentagon-level private security contractors and have the opportunity to obtain specialized tactical equipment, training, and other tangible resources at a reduced cost (Parker, 2007). At the federal level, in addition to extending the reach of the Department of Homeland Security, agencies such as the Immigration and Naturalization Services have used the cover of the Super Bowl event to search for undocumented workers. Transportation and Safety...
Administration (the agency overseeing US airport security) has used the Super Bowl to expand its security methods into civilian settings. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has used the event to check its ‘most wanted’ list. The linkages between government, security entrepreneurs, and the NFL expands yearly to include multiple partners across multiple scales; planning for Super Bowl security currently begins two years prior to the event and can involve up to 70 agencies (Heinze, 2006).

This security expansion at NFL events justifies the accelerated, intensifying militarization of US urban space in the post-9/11 era. The ongoing claim by the NFL and multiple government sources that ‘everything changed’ on 9/11 reminds us constantly of the violence of the attacks and of our continued vulnerability. Fear and uncertainly regarding when ‘they’ are going to hit us next becomes the new normal. The Super Bowl, the cities and stadiums that host it, and we, as football fans and residents of urban communities, are portrayed as being under constant threat. In this discourse, both the city and the event are, in military parlance, ‘target rich environments’. As Grey and Wyly (2007) summarize, numerous capital, political, and legal resources ‘were invested in the ideological construction of a suddenly vulnerable American Homeland’ (p. 329). In US cities, they argue, increasing aspects of ‘everyday life and death now take place in the certainty of uncertainty in an endless American war on terror’ (p. 330). I am extending this argument to suggest that since ‘everything changed on September 11’ and since the deployment of state and corporate power is the ‘necessary’ (and thus uncontestable) response to protecting our ‘freedom’, there are few public outcries to the fact that massive military build-up now accompanies the Super Bowl and that it is an extraordinary incursion into urban civic life – it alters traffic patterns, restricts movement throughout the city and commerce in NFL ‘clean zones’ that extend a mile out from the stadium, and subjects citizens to military operational and security procedures that they do not encounter anywhere else, including at US airports (the NFL even prohibits ‘running’ in NFL zones).

I suggest that the convergence of NFL interests and the US national domestic security agenda was formally institutionalized with the adoption of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) embedding resilience strategies into domestic counter-terrorism policy and with the exemption, granted in 2009, of the NFL from terrorism-related lawsuits. In the next section, I present an overview of the NIPP. The purpose here is not to suggest that the US has adopted a resilience approach to all domestic counter-terrorism policy, nor is it to present an in-depth analysis of the range of measures included in a resilience agenda. Rather, the purpose is to trace the emergence of resilience discourse in one example of US counter-terrorism policy, show its increased emphasis over time, and locate the NFL’s exceptionalism within the policy framework.

Critical infrastructure protection and sport stadiums: Emphasizing resilience in security policy

Within the critical infrastructure and key resources protection area, national priorities must include preventing catastrophic loss of life and managing cascading, disruptive impacts on the US and global economies across multiple threat scenarios. Achieving this goal requires a strategy that appropriately balances resiliency – a traditional American strength in adverse
times – with focused, risk-informed prevention, protection, and preparedness activities so that we can manage and reduce the most serious risks we face. (NIPP, 2009: i) (Michael Chertoff, 2nd Secretary of the US Department of Homeland Security under George W. Bush, 2005–2009)

The practices employed by the NFL and its US counter-terrorism partners – increasing electronic surveillance of urban space, increasing sophistication of security planning, territorial closure, linking security strategy to the competition for mobile capital – are all evidence of the resilience-oriented trends outlined by Coaffee and Wood (2006) and occurred at the same time in which the US government first embraced, and then emphasized, resilience in formal counter-terrorism policy. Resilience, as Coaffee (2009) and others (see for example, Jacobs, 2005; Medd and Marvin, 2005) explain, is a transdisciplinary concept that integrates natural, physical, and socio-political features. Resilience against terrorism has become a salient concept for policy-makers in recent years as security policy shifts from building up more solid walls of protection (see Davis, 1995) toward actions that minimize the consequences and emphasize the ‘bounce-backability’ (see Coaffee and Wood, 2006: 508) of a terrorist attack. This shift is evident in the US, for example, in national policy devoted to protecting the nation’s Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR).

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 that created the DHS also gave it wide-ranging responsibilities for leading and coordinating the nation’s CIKR protection, originally defined as targets whose destruction ‘could create local disaster or profoundly damage our nation’s morale or confidence’ and ‘high profile events [. . .] strongly coupled to our national symbols or national morale’ (US Congressional Research Service, 2004: 8). Included in the government’s list of CIKR are sports stadiums and arenas, namely all 112 that host the nation’s professional sports league franchises, including the NFL (US Department of Homeland Security, 2010b). The NIPP provides the overarching approach for integrating the nations’ CIKR protection initiatives in a single effort.

The first NIPP (2006) was developed in response to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, which defined responsibilities for the DHS and certain other federal agencies that represent 18 different industry sectors responsible for various CIKR, such as national monuments, nuclear reactors, and government facilities. Sports stadiums are located within the DHS’s commercial facilities sector (NIPP, 2009). Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 did not include an explicit emphasis on resiliency. Thus, the dominant focus of the 2006 NIPP was on asset protection, defined by the DHS as ‘actions that deter the threat, mitigate vulnerabilities, or minimize the consequences associated with an attack or disaster’ rather than on asset resiliency, which is defined as ‘[. . .] the ability to resist, absorb, recover from, or successfully adapt to adversity [. . .]’. Over time, some of the stakeholders ‘believed that the concept of continuity and resilience in and of itself, was not articulated and addressed as clearly as needed for their purposes’ (US Government Accountability Office, 2010).

Policy emphasis on resilience increased in 2009 with the second NIPP document and through the recommendations of the National Infrastructure Advisory Council, a group with 30 Presidentially appointed members from private industry, academia, and state and local government. The 175-page 2009 NIPP (which remains the most current version),
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subtitled ‘Partnering to enhance protection and resilience’, emphasizes resilience with the same level of importance as protection. This did not, however, stop the criticisms of some stakeholders, who felt that resiliency was still under-emphasized. Eventually members of Congress asked the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) to compare the 2007 and 2009 NIPP policy statements with respect to their emphasis on resilience. The GAO found that the 2006 NIPP used resilience or resiliency-related terms 93 times while the 2009 NIPP used those terms 183 times, almost twice as often. In addition, the 2009 NIPP inserts the term resilience in some chapter titles and refers to resiliency alongside protection in the introductory section of the document. According to DHS officials interviewed for the study, the changes in the 2009 NIPP were not representative of a major shift in domestic security policy, but rather were intended ‘to increase attention to and awareness about resiliency as it applies within individual sectors’ (US Government Accountability Office, 2010: 23). In September 2009, the National Infrastructure Advisory Council published its final report and recommendations to the President. Titled ‘Critical Infrastructure Resilience’, the report has links to 40 other studies, committee reports and recommendations that have the term resilient or resiliency in their titles (National Infrastructure Advisory Council, 2009).

As Coaffee and O’Hare (2008) have explored, building resilience into infrastructure security fuses risk-management policy-making agendas across a range of scales and stakeholders. I am suggesting that in the US, the inclusion of sports stadiums and arenas in the NIPP created a unique and unprecedented institutionalized relationship between sports league owners, facility managers, and the DHS providing structures through which resilience strategies and protocols can be explored (and funded). Thus, ‘old’ strategies for protecting sport venues and events can be vetted by the DHS and new ways of managing the risks of contemporary forms of terrorist attack can be developed and deployed. US domestic securitization strategies, which now embrace resilience more than ever before, extend through sport in ways not seen (and not possible) in a pre-9/11 context. The first DHS assessment of large stadiums occurred in 2005 through an online Vulnerability Self-Assessment Tool (Hall, 2008). Post-NIPP stadium security strategies emphasize collaboration of multiple partners, emergency planning and the exercise of ‘what if’ scenarios (see Elmer and Opel, 2006). In addition to the protection strategies discussed above, the resilience framework in the NIPP has led, for example, to funding from the DHS, through the commercial facilities sector of Infrastructure Protection, to initiate the development of a modeling tool for stadium evacuation in the event of terrorist attack or other disaster. The project, publically announced in March 2010, is a collaboration between REGAL (a company contracted by the Secret Service), and the University of Mississippi’s National Center for Sport Safety and Security (US Department of Homeland Security, 2010a). As another example, in April 2010 the DHS hosted a two-day sports league security conference and tabletop exercise that was attended by over 200 representatives from US sport leagues, private security companies, academia, law enforcement, and every level of government. The DHS emphasized that the tabletop exercise challenged participants to develop ways to work together and to ‘share best practices’ because ‘high-profile sporting and related events [. . .] can also be high-target opportunities for terrorists and other criminals’ (US Department of Homeland Security, 2010b).
The stadiums that host NFL franchises and events make up a small portion of the nation’s sport stadiums and arenas contained in the NIPP and the number of fans attending NFL events is the smallest among the US professional sport leagues: the NFL drew 17 million fans in the 2009 season, compared to 21 million each for the National Hockey League and the National Basketball League, and 73 million for Major League Baseball (US Department of Homeland Security, 2010b). The NFL stadium with the largest occupancy capacity, FedEx Field, seats just under 92,000 people, and the second largest, New Meadowlands Stadium, seats 82,000. There are 20 National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) stadiums and arenas that each hold over 90,000 spectators (Kosk, 2010). Consider also that as many as 400,000 stock car racing fans may attend a single NASCAR event. Yet, as I have argued, the NFL and its stadiums and events enjoy a uniquely privileged position within US domestic security policy. But the NFL’s exceptional sport status within US counter-terrorism policy goes beyond support for security actions per se, to include legal protection in the event that those actions fail to deter a terrorist attack. The NFL’s ability to ‘bounce-back’ from a terrorist event is aided by DHS and by the same legal structures that protect military contractors in the battlefield. This protection is of obvious financial importance to the League, for as the NFL’s Chief of Security (and former FBI official) stated, ‘An attack from a terrorist organization could put us out of business’ (Frank, 2009). Coaffee and Wood (2006) suggest that contemporary securitization is more personal than ever before. As I show below, in post-9/11 US all citizens are enlisted into the war on terrorism – in ways that are not completely voluntary.

**Citizen-soldiering the homeland**

The National Football League [has] won exemption for lawsuits under a post-9/11 law that prohibits them from being sued if terrorists attack a site they are protecting. The protection extends only to companies’ services and equipment that the Homeland Security Department has approved as being effective in anti-terrorism [. . .] and whose products have Homeland Security’s highest reliability rating. (Frank, 2009: 3A)

Shortly after 9/11 numerous lawsuits were filed against airports, airplane manufacturers, security companies and government agencies (e.g. Port Authority of New York/New Jersey) for failure to protect the US citizenry. The cases were allowed to proceed after a federal judge ruled that the use of an airplane as a suicide weapon was potentially foreseeable (andyfrain.com, 2010). As a result, even companies whose products were not part of the immediate post-9/11 litigation feared the possibility of future suits from victims, with unlimited liability costs, if another terrorist attack were to occur. Insurance costs for all terrorism-related ‘potentially foreseeable’ risks became incredibly expensive and the federal government grew concerned that the massive ‘liability could stifle the entrepreneurial spirit for developing technologies and products that disrupt attacks and enable an effective response’ (NIPP, 2009: 89). Congress responded by passing the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies (or SAFETY) Act of 2002.

The SAFETY Act, which was a part of the larger Homeland Security Act (discussed above), had the specific purpose of ensuring that the threat of liability does not deter
potential sellers from developing, commercializing, and deploying anti-terrorism technologies (NIPP, 2009: 89). The SAFETY Act incentivizes the deployment of new and innovative anti-terrorism technologies by providing liability protections to companies whose products or services have successfully passed DHS review and are awarded Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology (QATT) status. There are two levels of protection available: the first is a QATT ‘Designation’, which limits the amount of liability insurance the seller must maintain; the second and highest is a ‘Certification,’ which effectively eliminates the seller’s liability against victim’s claims arising from acts of terrorism. A Certification provides the seller with a complete defense in litigation related to the ‘performance of the technology in preventing, detecting, or deterring terrorist acts or deployment to recover from one’ (safetyact.gov). Certification status means that the product is among those ‘approved for Homeland security’ and placed on the Approved Products List for Homeland Security on the SAFETY Act website.

In March 2009, the NFL was awarded the DHS’s Certification through the year 2016 for its ‘NFL Best Practices for Stadium Security’, a nine-page document outlining the League’s guidelines for stadium and event security and operations. Details contained in the NFL Guidelines are not available to the public (QATT specifics are exempt from the US Freedom of Information Act); however, numerous media outlets reported that the DHS awarded the NFL’s practices of digital surveillance, spectator searches, the enforcement of barricaded zones, threat assessments, and the hiring, vetting, and training of personnel (see for example, Frank, 2009; Renieris, 2009). In a USA Today report, a Homeland Security spokeswoman commented on the success of the SAFETY Act protection in leading to the ‘wider deployment of anti-terrorism technologies and services’ (Frank, 2009: 3A). Other companies receiving the DHS Certification include aviation giant Boeing Corp., for its strengthened flight deck doors on aircraft, and IBM for software that can more accurately verify names and identities. The protection provided to the sellers of certified anti-terrorism technologies such as the NFL is linked to previously established legal doctrines.

**Government contractor defense**

According to the regulations codified in the SAFETY Act, a Certification entitles the seller to assert the Government Contractor Defense (GCD), which ‘immunizes sellers’ against claims arising from acts of terrorism (US Federal Register, 2006: 33149). The GCD, spanning more than 50 years of jurisprudence, is the primary defense historically used by military contractors or ‘private military firms’. In laymen’s terms, the GCD provides that a US soldier or soldier’s family cannot sue the Pentagon’s suppliers for injury or death the soldier incurs while on duty, even if caused by defective equipment (e.g. a gun fails to fire, a gas mask leaks). The foundation of contemporary GCD is the US Supreme Court case *Boyle v United Technologies Corp.*, 487 US 500 (1988) involving the estate of a marine helicopter pilot who drowned when his escape hatch failed to allow him to escape his downed aircraft. In deciding for the helicopter manufacturer, the US Supreme Court set forth a three-pronged test against which all future immunity claims would be made: that the United States approved of the manufacturer’s specifications; that the equipment conformed to those specifications; and, that the
supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment (see Radowsky, 2005: 14).

Radowsky’s (2005) analysis delineates the numerous ways in which the Boyle decision has been used to expand the GCD far beyond its original military context and design defect origins (her analysis does not, however, include the SAFETY Act exemption). Part of this expansion, Radowsky illustrates, has been ‘horizontal’, extending beyond military contractors and procurement contracts to shield items provided by sub-contractors and nonmilitary contractors. Through the SAFETY Act, the DHS extends the GCD to sport and to civilian companies and cases where products or services are provided under government approval. Boyle’s three-pronged test becomes part of the vetting process used to determine which products and services receive a Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology Designation and which are awarded DHS Certification with sovereign immunity. With respect to the NFL, its DHS Certification means that if a terrorist action occurs at an NFL event, or within NFL zones of the city, victims and victims’ estates cannot sue the League to compensate for death or injury, even if the NFL’s security practices are shown to be faulty. In practical terms, the SAFETY Act exemption means that the NFL is legally viewed as the same as a Pentagon supplier, and we, the citizens, are the soldiers at war.

‘If you see something, say something’™

I argue that citizen soldiers in the US are now being recruited by the DHS to participate in a public awareness campaign to report ‘suspicious activity’ to state and local law enforcement agencies. The ‘If you see something, say something’™ campaign was launched in July 2010 in conjunction with the National Suspicious Activities Reporting Initiative (NSI), but received its widest advertisement when DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano personally announced it at the 2011 Super Bowl in Arlington, Texas, encouraging individual citizens to play an ‘active role in keeping the country safe’. In addition, the 2011 Super Bowl campaign included print and video advertisements and a training video for ‘NFL employees to ensure that both employees and fans have the tools they need to identify and report suspicious activities and threats’ (US Department of Homeland Security, 2011a). Licensed to the DHS, the campaign was originally implemented by New York City’s Metropolitan Transportation Authority but is now a part of the NSI effort to ‘develop, evaluate, and implement common processes and policies for gathering, documenting, processing, analyzing, and sharing information about terrorism-related suspicious activities’ (US Department of Homeland Security, 2011b).

In their discussion of the reterritorialization of security, Coaffee and Wood (2006) argue that security discourses, procedures, and even material examples of national security deployments are telescoping down to smaller scales. Homeland security defense against global threats now extend ‘right down to personal safety as one continuous spectrum of security’ (Coaffee and Wood, 2006: 515). Crime prevention, anti-social behavior measures, and security all become merged together in a wide range of policy agendas, accompanied by the rhetoric that we are living in a dangerous and uncertain world. In this context, anti-terror initiatives have become the new normal in US cities, reshaping the spaces and interstices of daily life (see Wekerle and Jackson,
Moving beyond Coafffee and Wood, I suggest that the DHS’s ‘If you see something, say something™’ campaign enlists ordinary citizens into the war on terror underscoring the concept that ‘an alert public plays a critical role in keeping our nation safe’ (US Department of Homeland Security, 2011b). We are all citizen soldiers, and the war is everywhere.

Conclusion

The citizen soldier concept is an ideal abstraction, used especially in the American Revolution based on the notion that citizens have an obligation to arm themselves to defend their communities against foreign invaders and domestic tyrants. In his examination of cities as battlespaces (a term he borrows from Blackmore, 2005), Stephen Graham (2009) invokes the concept of the citizen soldier in his discussion of the ways in which military urbanism gains legitimacy by its seamless extension into popular, urban, and material culture. US weapons systems and Predator drones, for example, cross over into the latest warfare consumer video games and US military vehicles cross over into civilian Sports Utility Vehicles in a circuit of cultural militarization linking domestic cities to occupied ones. Within the new military urbanism, Graham argues, the everyday sites and spaces of the city are becoming the main battlespaces both at home and abroad. The battlespace concept is distinct from notions of war taking place in battlefields, which have time and geographical limits. Battlespace, on the other hand, is limitless, ‘nothing lies outside of it’, it is the ‘boundless and unending process of militarization where everything becomes the site of permanent war’ (Graham, 2009: 389). It is this concept, according to Graham, which lies at the heart of contemporary efforts to urbanize and militarize security doctrine, and it works by collapsing conventional military-civilian binaries. Security doctrine now blurs the operational and legal separations between for example, war and peace and global and local scales.

A number of sport studies scholars have examined the ways in which the NFL is linked to manufacturing consent for the ‘war on terror’ through its militarized cultural spectacles and media discourses associated with it (see for example, Butterworth, 2008; Falcous and Silk, 2005; King, 2008; Schimmel, 2011; Silk and Falcous, 2005). What I have suggested here goes beyond that. I can be a fan of the NFL’s brand of professional football, consume its products and watch its competitions through the media, and yet, I retain some degree of agency enabling me to resist its ideological messages, subvert its dominate meanings, or withhold my consent for the military operations the League endorses. At the present historical moment, however, I cannot attend an NFL event or be present in the urban location that the NFL is ‘protecting’, without in effect, being on active duty in the US war on terror. In the event of a terrorist attack, my physical presence appears to legally equate me with a soldier at war. However, as Sebok (2003) provocatively points out, US military soldiers who are injured in the line of duty benefit from veteran pensions and government-provided medical care. A citizen soldier who is injured in a terrorist attack has no right to financial compensation (under conditions of SAFETY Act Certification). The NFL goes to great lengths to assure fans that they are in the ‘safest place on earth’ when they attend a game (Schimmel, 2011). In fact, however, and as I have argued in this article, it is not fans that are protected, it is the NFL.
The 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks fell on a Sunday, the day the NFL opened its 2011 season. A night game was scheduled at FedEx Field between the New York Giants and the Washington (DC) Redskins. Throughout most of 2010 and 2011, the NFL was embroiled in a labor dispute (settled in July 2011) resulting in an ownership ‘lock out’ of the players that threatened the entire 2011 NFL football season. According to ESPN Sports television (Outside the Lines, 8 Sunday 2011) the players planned to argue to the courts that the 2011 season must begin on time because the ‘nation needs’ the NFL to play on 11 September 2011.

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Notes

1. The acceptance, popularization, and glorification of the military in the guise of the US soldier has changed over time. From the late 1960s through the 1990s oppositional voices problematized the relationship more so than is currently the case. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this insight.
2. The authorial position for this article is that of a US citizen.
3. Schimmel (2006) included an exploratory examination of the urban militarization involving the 2005 and 2006 Super Bowls. Schimmel (2011) is a media analysis of the security discourse surrounding all the Super Bowls in the post-9/11 era based upon data from internet posts and newspaper articles from US news media sources published between 2000 and 2010. The present study draws upon these prior studies, and in addition includes new data from legal documents and US national and local government agencies’ policy documents, reports, and commissioned studies.
4. The US Congress, based upon its Constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce, passed the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890 to prohibit monopolies of any kind (The Lenix Information Project, 2011). In 1922, the US Supreme Court formally granted Major League Baseball an exemption from the Sherman Act ruling that ‘the business [of] giving exhibitions of baseball’ did not constitute interstate commerce. Since then there have been numerous US Congressional hearings considering the sports exemption, but none have dismantled it. The other US professional sports leagues benefit from the precedent set in the baseball case, though there some situations in which the Sherman Act has been applied to them differently (US Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 2011).
5. Portions of the preceding text were adapted from Schimmel (2001).
6. For a description of the ways in which the NFL and FOX Television packaged the first Super Bowl after the 9/11 attacks, including a discussion of the Super Bowl’s ‘delimited construction of citizenship in contemporary America’ and its affirmation of ‘civil religion’ see Butterworth (2008).
7. For example, McCourt (2010) reports on the development of the newly opened New Meadowlands Stadium, site of the Super Bowl in 2014, which was designed to ‘focus on
deterrence as a secured, hard target’ and includes a command and control center developed in partnership with the NFL and the US Department of Homeland Security’s Command, Control and Interoperability Division. For a broader discussion of the ‘security legacies’ left by sports mega-events, see Giulianotti and Klauser (2010).

8. For example, the NFL requires 19,000 ‘quality hotel’ rooms within an hour’s drive of the stadium for use by NFL-related groups and another 25,000 hotel rooms within an hour’s drive for use by the general public; the establishment of a one-mile ‘clean zone’ around the stadium and pertinent downtown areas where unauthorized merchandise vending is prohibited; the cities provide the NFL with cost-free venues for entertainment and parties hosted by the NFL; that the cities provide 600,000 square feet of space for the NFL’s temporary theme park ‘The NFL Experience’; and that cities must give up control of parking lots (car parks) around the stadium.

9. For a broader discussion of the intensified depth and mutuality of the sport–war nexus in the post-9/11 era, see King (2008).

10. It is important to note that in the period between 2000 and 2010 there were no credible, specific threats against NFL stadiums or the Super Bowl event reported in US print and online media. However in 2008 and again in 2009, the FBI and DHS released a threat assessment bulletin that warned operators of transit systems, stadiums, hotels and entertainment complexes to be on heightened alert for attack. As reported by the Associated Press, the bulletin made specific reference to an al-Qaida training manual that lists ‘blasting and destroying the places of amusement, immorality and sin . . . and attacking vital economic centers’. However, media reports also quoted DHS officials as stating they had, ‘no information regarding the timing, location or target’ of any attacks (see Hays and Barrett, 2009). A widely reported threat of a dirty bomb attack against NFL stadiums in 2008, turned out to be a hoax.

11. The use of facial recognition technology (FRT) has resulted in a fair amount of public discourse. After its utilization in the 2001 Super Bowl, the RAND Center commissioned a report on the issues of privacy rights and the countervailing benefits of FRT to national security. The author of that report presented a number of policy recommendations to maximize FRT utility while minimizing threats to privacy (see Woodward, 2001). In the time period immediately following the 9/11 attacks, justifications for the use of FRT grew immensely (see Lyon, 2003).

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